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Murder and Mass Murder in Pre-Modern Latin 
America: From Pre-Colonial Aztec Sacrifices to the 
End of Colonial Rule, an Introductory Comparison 
with European Societies 
Eric A. Johnson, Ricardo D. Salvatore & Pieter Spierenburg  
Abstract: »Mord und Massenmord im prämodernen Lateinamerika. Von den 
präkolonialen aztekischen Opferungen bis zum Ende der Kolonialherrschaft, 
ein einführender Vergleich mit europäischen Gesellschaften«. Over the past 
several decades, the study of violence and homicide in a number of pre-modern 
and modern European societies has become an area of considerable scholarly 
focus. Through the painstaking efforts of many scholars, we now can state with 
considerable confidence that the long-term trajectory of homicide rates in most 
European societies has undergone a dramatic decline over the centuries. Indeed 
homicide rates on average in European societies appear to have declined by a 
factor of fifteen to twenty times from the late 15th century to the present, with 
the biggest drop taking place in the years between roughly 1450 and 1750. In 
this special Focus of Historical Social Research six scholars from five differ-
ent countries and three different continents collaborate to discern if similar 
trends took place during these same years in violent behavior in Latin Ameri-
can societies. Although only some parallels are immediately apparent, this col-
laborative and comparative effort marks perhaps a beginning scientific step 
toward an understanding of patterns of Latin American and global violence 
over the long haul of history. 
Keywords: violence, murder rates, mass murder, colonial Latin America, Az-
tec sacrifice, smallpox, European comparisons. 
 
This special Focus of Historical Social Research concentrates on the long-term 
history of interpersonal and mass violence (particularly killing) in pre-colonial 
and in colonial Latin America. As such, it represents one of the first products of 
a project on global murder, mass murder, and violence that began over four 
years ago with a conference held in Mt. Pleasant, Michigan, on the history of 
murder and violence in Latin American history. Since that time a number of 
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additional specialized conferences have been held focusing on other areas of 
the world such as Africa, India and Indonesia (held in Rotterdam, The Nether-
lands) and on Russia, China, and the Soviet Union (held in Helsinki, Finland). 
The overall goal of the project is to determine if the trends in violence that a 
number of scholars have detected for European societies might also apply to 
other areas of the globe (for attempts to synthesize the scholarship on the sub-
ject produced in the last few decades, see, for example, the works of Manuel 
Eisner (2003), Ted Robert Gurr (1977; 1981), Eric A. Johnson and Eric H. 
Monkkonen (1996), and Pieter Spierenburg (2008). Very succinctly put, it 
appears that the long-term trajectory of interpersonal acts of murder and proba-
bly of violence generally in European societies have declined markedly from 
the fifteenth century and probably earlier to the present. The cause of this de-
cline in murder is not absolutely certain, but it does appear that the theoretical 
arguments of the sociologist Norbert Elias about the effects of what he called 
“the civilization process” may help to explain the decline in person to person 
violence. 
Whereas patterns of murder in many European societies that have now been 
studied empirically appear to follow a similar downward trajectory over the 
centuries (with the largest drop taking place apparently over the roughly three 
hundred years between the mid 15th and the mid 18th centuries, very little is 
known about the long-term trajectory of murder in other parts of the world, 
and, in the case of mass murder, little has been established empirically for any 
part of the world, including Europe itself. 
In this focus edition, three prominent scholars of Latin America, hailing 
from three different countries (Wolfgang Gabbert from Germany, Martha Few 
from the United States, and Caroline Dodds Pennock from The United King-
dom) have presented seminal essays on violence in pre-colonial Latin America. 
In his essay “The longe durée of Colonial Violence in Latin America,” Wolf-
gang Gabbert courageously provides perhaps the first long-term assessment of 
the trajectory of violence from the beginning of Colonial rule in Latin America 
in the 16th century to the end of Colonial rule at the beginning of the 18th 
century. After Gabbert’s essay, two more specialized essays follow by Dodds 
Pennock and Few. In his essay, Gabbert argues that the trajectory of violence 
broadly speaking appeared to decline with the establishment of Colonial Rule 
but to increase in the latter part of the Colonial period as Colonial rule began to 
break down with the emergence of independence movements in many parts of 
Latin America. One might argue that this pattern in itself jibes with what one 
might expect from Norbert Elias’s theory of civilization. As in Europe, once 
state rule (in this case Colonial rule) became more fully entrenched and ac-
cepted, the state became ever more the arbiter of dispute settlement and this led 
to a decline in murder and violence. Previous to the emergence of central state 
authority in Europe and Latin America, the high rates of homicide and violence 
that obtained in many localities were caused by the interpersonal settling of 
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scores and through honor-related practices such as personal vendettas and the 
like. But, once Colonial rule began to confront serious opposition in the eigh-
teenth and early nineteenth centuries, more people presumably stopped accept-
ing the state’s intercession in the settling of disputes and took matters into their 
own hands, leading to increases in murder and violence. 
The intriguing essay “Mass Murder or Religious Homicide: Rethinking 
Human Sacrifice and Interpersonal Violence in Aztec Society,” by Caroline 
Dodds Pennock examines the issue of Aztec sacrifices in pre-Colonial Latin 
America and asks the question whether these sacrifices represented mass mur-
der or simply religious practice. In the course of her investigation, she also 
makes important estimates about the numbers of people sacrificed in this pre-
Colonial period, demonstrating that the sheer volume of violence at the time 
was certainly enormous, no matter whether one defines it as mass murder or 
religious practice. Finally, Martha Few studies “Medical Humanitarianism and 
Smallpox Inoculation in Eighteenth-Century Guatemala.” In this essay she 
demonstrates how the Colonial rulers attempted to act beneficently by offering 
inoculations against smallpox that could significantly curb the death and disa-
bility that the accursed disease inflicted on the Guatemalan population. This in 
effect could be seen as part of the benefits of “the civilizing process” for Latin 
American societies that Elias theorized about for European societies. The 
trouble is that by the late eighteenth century many Latin Americans had be-
come severely distrustful of European colonization and distrusted their colonial 
rulers’ attempts at humanitarianism. This resistance to central authority on the 
part of the indigenous population may have presaged the state’s breakdown, 
and resultant increases in murder and violence in Latin America often followed 
in the wake of the decline and eventual disappearance of Colonial rule in the 
nineteenth century. In several countries of Latin America the presence of vi-
olence in the post-Colonial period (especially perhaps in recent decades) ap-
pears to have increased rather than decreased as central state rule has struggled 
to establish itself against drug gangs, radical resistance movements, and restive 
populations tired of “disappearances” and wary of central authority. 
Thus, whereas many Latin American scholars have been fascinated with 
Michel Foucault and his views of modernization and violence instead of those 
of Norbert Elias, the essays presented here make a beginning with testing the 
latter’s theories for this part of the world. A few general observations are in 
order when we attempt to compare Europe and Latin America from the pers-
pective of an “Eliasian” approach. First, the Latin American continent did not 
witness a feudal period and hence no clear-cut transition by which the elites 
turned from warriors into courtiers. Second, though many historians speak 
freely of an “ancien régime” in the colonies of the Spanish empire, the analo-
gies are only metaphoric. Historians recognize that a great gap separated the 
European “ancien régime” from the different colonial situations of Hispanic 
and Portuguese America. The lifestyles of vice-regal bureaucracies and of elite 
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Peruvians and New Spaniards during the period 1570-1800 bear little resem-
blance to the sociability at European courts in these years. The problems in-
volved in colonial governance in Spanish America were different from those 
facing dynastic crowns in Europe. The Spanish crown had to exert dominance 
in situations, whereas, in part due to distance from the metropolis, colonial 
authorities felt entitled to act independently, responding to local interests. Once 
more, the result was that the incorporation of warriors into courtly society, a 
crucial long-term socio-genetic process for Elias, does not have a parallel in 
Hispanic America. 
Another challenge refers to the fact that early modernity came to Spanish 
and Portuguese America in the form of conquest and colonization. Coloniza-
tion entailed a protracted “civilizing impulse,” which included vast operations 
such as the evangelization campaigns, the reduction of indigenous populations 
in cities, and the re-organization of production in mines, haciendas, and planta-
tions. All of these colonial “designs” contemplated some kind of control of 
conduct. On the other hand, it is fair to argue that, at least in the first two hun-
dred years of Spanish and Portuguese rule, the imposition of a colonial order 
was achieved through violence and coercion. Nevertheless, the consolidation of 
hybrid forms of governance, that included European institutions and pre-
existing indigenous forms of representation, produced a long-lasting pacifica-
tion, until this was shaken by revolts since the mid-eighteenth century and in 
particular the great Andean rebellions of the 1780s. 
Viewed in this way, the relationship between colonization and violence is 
two-sided. On the one hand, colonization necessitated the perpetration of vi-
olence on the subjugated indigenous populations, in order to produce subordi-
nation to Spanish authorities, some degree of conformity and deference to 
colonial officials, a transformation of everyday practices among the colonized, 
and a radical change in their religious beliefs. On the other hand, the consolida-
tion of state colonial rule with its consequent monopoly in the use of force 
translated to decreased levels of state violence. Indigenous peoples were com-
pelled to constrain their aggressive impulses: they were prohibited from wear-
ing swords, drinking alcohol, or riding horses. To be sure, some exemplary 
public punishments had to be applied periodically in order to remind the colo-
nized who was in power. Yet by and large the level of state repression exer-
cised by the colonial state in the central areas (New Spain and Peru) was signif-
icantly lower in the 1750s than it had been in the 1570s. 
The remainder of this introductory essay summarizes the European evidence 
and provides a bit more argumentation on the rationale for a project of global 
magnitude attempting to assess the trajectory of murder and mass murder over 
the centuries. Hence for a series of meetings held to study violence in a global 
perspective, the objectives of the overall project were summarized as follows: 
(1) combining the research on the long-term history of homicide and interper-
sonal violence with that of mass murder or genocide; (2) geographically ex-
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tending the research on homicide in Western and Central Europe and North 
America to Eastern Europe and the non-Western world; and (3) chronologically 
extending the research on genocide, which up to now largely focuses on the 
post-1900 period, to previous centuries and on a world-wide basis. 
State of the Art: Homicide in Europe and North America 
Within historical scholarship concerning homicide in this part of the world 
there is roughly a split between two approaches that each have their strengths 
but also their weaknesses. These are (1) a quantitative and statistical approach 
focusing on the incidence of violence; (2) a cultural and largely descriptive 
approach oriented toward case studies. The positive element of the first ap-
proach is its long-term perspective, whereas the negative element concerns its 
neglect of qualitative evidence about culture and social context. A focus on 
precisely this evidence constitutes the positive side of the second approach, 
whose weakness lies in the lack of a longitudinal perspective. Until today, few 
scholars have combined these two approaches. Yet, there is an emerging inte-
grated approach that combines precisely the strengths of these two separate 
traditions. We begin by briefly mentioning the work that has been done accord-
ing to the first approach. In terms of longitudinal research, this work extends 
back at least two centuries prior to the introduction of published national statis-
tics. 
The quantitative analysis of murder over the long haul of history began in 
the 1980s, notably in England. The standard used is the homicide rate, a con-
ventional measure referring to the annual (average) number of killings per 
100,000 inhabitants in a specified geographic place. In a seminal article, the 
political scientist Ted Robert Gurr (1981) concluded that the English rates had 
decreased more than twenty-fold from the middle ages to the twentieth century. 
His conclusion, and that of scholars performing similar analyses after him, 
depended heavily on the work of local investigators.  
During the 1990s additional evidence was collected for countries such as 
Sweden and The Netherlands (Österberg 1991; Spierenburg 1996). The studies 
in question showed an even steeper decline of homicide rates than those ob-
served for England. The Dutch rates, for example, declined from about 50 in 
the fifteenth century to under one by the mid-twentieth. Although there were 
temporary upsurges of murder, the overall decline was steady, with decreases 
in each century. 
Since the turn of the century Manuel Eisner has been collecting a quantita-
tive data base of European homicide. He distinguishes five regions: England, 
Scandinavia, the Low Countries, Germany/Switzerland and Italy. Ongoing 
work by a few other scholars provides additional evidence for countries like 
Spain and Ireland (e.g. Ian O’Donnell in Body-Gendrot and Spierenburg eds. 
2008; but also in this volume Rousseaux et al. on Belgium). Hence, we have a 
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picture of the quantitative longitudinal development of homicide in Europe 
west of the former Iron Curtain, with the notable exception of France where 
this type of research has hardly been performed. The combined result of the 
work done in various countries is the identification of a secular decline of mur-
der in Europe (see graph below). Although homicide rates show a slight rise in 
many countries since roughly 1970, this rise is insignificant in view of the 
preceding massive decrease (and possibly the trend is reversing presently). 
Figure 1: The Long-Term Decline of Homicide in Europe per 100,000 Pop.  
Annually: Average Estimates per Century 
 
Source: Spierenburg, 2008. 
 
Historical homicide research in North America is mostly quantitative too. Re-
search on the history of homicide rates in the United States started with Roger 
Lane’s study of Philadelphia (1979) and was followed by, among other studies, 
that of Monkkonen on New York (2001) and McKanna’s on the American 
West (1997; 2002). Rates in the United States, unlike those if Canada, have 
usually been higher than those in Europe and the picture of a long-term decline 
is less unequivocal. On the whole, however, the twentieth century in the United 
States was less homicidal than the nineteenth. However, the recent synthesis by 
Randolph Roth (2009), while significantly extending our knowledge about 
American murder rates, presents a more complicated picture (further discussed 
below). 
When examining the case study approach it should be stressed that, at least 
for Europe, its representatives do not contradict or contest the main findings of 
the quantitative approach, namely the long-term decline of homicide. In fact, 
when taken together, they provide support for this finding by suggesting that 
ritual and honorific elements in homicide were more characteristic of the me-
dieval and early modern periods than of later periods. On the other hand, the 
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killing of intimate victims, as opposed to that of strangers or mere acquain-
tances, appears to be more characteristic of modern murder.  
Intriguingly, although France is absent when it concerns the study of longi-
tudinal quantitative trends, France is the foremost country where the qualitative 
tradition has been very strong. One of its first representatives is an American 
historian writing about France. Natalie Zemon Davis (1987) studied petitions 
for pardon addressed to the French kings, in great majority by homicide con-
victs. She considered these petitions primarily as specimens of the art of story-
telling but also as a window on cultural codes such as concepts of honor. The 
work of other historians was based on this same type of source. Robert Mu-
chembled examined the pardon letters from Artois, then part of the Burgun-
dian, later Habsburg domains. Rather than as examples of storytelling, he used 
these documents as sources for a study of social life in Artois (Muchembled 
1989 and 2008). In a similar vein, Claude Gauvard (1991) examined a large 
body of French pardon letters from the Middle Ages, taking their murder tales 
as evidence for such phenomena as kinship structure and male-female relations. 
Honor and ritual were important themes for these authors too, as they were for 
Martin Dinges (1994) who studied violence in eighteenth-century Paris and 
François Ploux (2002) who did so in Southern France. 
From the 1990s onward, this qualitative type of research, stressing the ritual 
and honorific elements in violence, got under way outside France as well, most 
notably in Germany. The Netherlands, Southern Europe and Scandinavia soon 
followed suit. This research was based sometimes on pardon letters as well, but 
more often on criminal records. Descriptive case-studies on the theme of vi-
olence were performed in England too, although the quantitative tradition re-
mained strong there. Thus, descriptive research with a case-study approach has 
covered most of Europe to the west of the former Iron Curtain. The subject of 
dueling deserves special mention in this respect, because while most of the 
ritualistic violence seems characteristic for the medieval and early modern 
periods, dueling underwent a revival from the mid-nineteenth century until 
1914 (Frevert 1991; Hughes and Nye in Spierenburg ed. 1998; Peltonen 2003; 
Hughes 2007). 
Although the qualitative tradition of past murder research has been less 
prominent in the United States, a few imaginative syntheses have been pub-
lished (Courtwright 1996; Lane 1997). The relationship between violence and 
traditional male honor, including the subject of dueling, has been examined in 
particular for the Old South. 
With respect to the emerging integrated approach, one of us made several 
contributions (most recently in Spierenburg 2008). Essentially, the integrated 
approach combines the strengths of both traditional approaches through a lon-
gitudinal examination of quantitative as well as qualitative factors. This type of 
research might be denoted as the study of transformations in the character of 
homicide. The work of a few other scholars can be considered as belonging to 
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this integrated approach. Thus, Emsley (2005) examines both statistics and 
narrative sources for an analysis of the place of violence in English society 
since the mid-eighteenth century. Ongoing work by Tomás Mantecón (e.g. his 
contribution to Mucchielli and Spierenburg 2009) combines the study of homi-
cide rates and that of changes in ritual violence and family honor in early mod-
ern Spain. Efi Avdela (see her contribution to Mucchielli and Spierenburg 
2009, with reference to her work published in Greek) combines an analysis of 
notions of honor, public opinion and crime statistics for Greece in the 1950s 
and 1960s. Nassiet (2011), dealing with violence in early modern France, fo-
cuses on factors such as honor and vengeance but also provides data reducing 
the gap in our knowledge of French homicide rates. 
All of these authors agree that honor and gender are important factors for 
explaining transformations in homicide. These are also mutually related be-
cause, in any society, male honor differs essentially from female honor. Honor, 
moreover, is not a static factor. Sources of honor change over time. In particu-
lar, male honor moves from being based on bodily aggression to being based 
on inner qualities. This process of change is called the spiritualization of honor. 
It accompanied the massive decline of male-on-male fighting, while leaving 
intact the observation that serious violence is always committed disproportio-
nately by young males. 
The main findings referring to transformations of homicide in European his-
tory can be summed up as follows:  
1) The Middle Ages, with homicide rates of usually several dozen per hundred 
thousand inhabitants per year, were the most violent period in European his-
tory. 
2) This high level of homicide owed much to the prevalence of feuding, which 
in its turn was related to the low degree of the monopolization of force by 
public authorities, who condoned revenge within certain limits. 
3) The medieval elites were at least as violent as members of other social stra-
ta. 
4) Feuding was complemented by a system of reconciliation and peace-making 
which, however, did not reduce murder when viewed from a macro-level. 
5) The prevalence of both revenge and reconciliation made homicide into a 
private matter; the subsequent criminalization of homicide was a tedious 
process not completed until the mid-seventeenth century. 
6) The traditional concept of male honor played a crucial role in murder, but 
around 1500 a shift occurred to a code of fair fighting exemplified by the 
transition from often treacherous feuding to dueling. 
7) The early modern period was marked by the social differentiation of male 
fighting: various social classes acquired their own codes of defense and the 
upper and middle classes gradually adopted more peaceful habits. 
8) The great early modern decline in homicide rates was related to the simulta-
neous rise of pacified states monopolizing legitimate violence. 
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9) The emergence of the cultural model of the peaceful man, in the wake of the 
spiritualization of honor, constituted a crucial intermediary factor in this re-
lationship. 
10)  As male fighting declined, domestic violence and other forms of aggres-
sion involving women became more visible, but the character of spouse 
murder underwent changes as well. 
11)  From the eighteenth century onward the percentage of intimate murder 
victims rose significantly. 
12)  After 1800 male fighting became increasingly restricted to the working 
classes and the use of knives became more infrequent. 
13)  Simultaneously, new types of homicide came to the fore, among which the 
crime passionnel as the prototype of killing considered as excusable and 
serial murder as the prototype of killing that fascinated the public. 
14)  After 1970 homicide rates slightly rose again, but it is uncertain if this 
trend will continue because a number of communities in various countries 
such as in the United States have noticed considerable drops in recent 
years. 
State of the Art: Homicide in Selected Countries  
Outside the Western World 
Outside the Western world some preliminary reading has been done with re-
spect to five countries: China, India, Russia, Brazil and South-Africa. They 
were selected for their spread over several continents and because they are 
important countries. The reading, however, extended only to publications in 
Western languages. 
The literature on these countries involves little in the way of longitudinal 
quantitative research. Analyses of modern national statistics, during the Soviet 
Union’s demise for example, do of course exist. In this paper we focus on 
studies that go back at least before 1970. The English-language literature on 
China includes one monograph that analyzes homicide data (Buoye 2000), but 
only for cases related to conflicts over land in the South-East and restricted to 
the reign of Emperor Qianlong (1736-95). While Buoye observes a decline of 
murders over property rights, it appears that murders in the encompassing 
category of land and debt were slightly on the rise. And land and debt was just 
one out of four categories identified by the Chinese Ministry of Justice. Thus, 
we cannot calculate overall homicide rates from Buoye’s book. The literature 
on pre-1970 India yields two quantitative studies that deal, among other crimes, 
with violence (Nayar 1975 and contribution on Calcutta in Gurr et al. 1977). 
Nayar shows that national homicide rates, as published by the Indian FBI, were 
relatively steady at about 2.5 per 100,000 between 1953 and 1966 and then 
climbed to 2.9 in 1970. Average rates, 1959-68, per Indian state, each of them 
more populous than many a nation-state, fluctuated between 1.3 and 4.2. For 
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Russia, Stickley and Pridemore (2007) provide some homicide rates around 
1900, which confirm that by that time Russia lay in the “outer zone” in which 
rates were higher than in the core of Europe. We found no homicide rates for 
pre-1970 Brazil or South-Africa. 
The situation is a little better when studies about specific subjects involving 
murder and violence are concerned. China is of particular importance because 
of its long history as a nation and an empire. China had well-developed bureau-
cratic state structures, monopolizing the means of legitimate violence, when 
Europe was yet to experience the middle ages (Hui 2005). The historiography 
dealing with its oldest history, well into the first millennium AD, is based 
largely on narrative sources. Because Lewis (1990) focuses on the so-called 
warring states period before unification, it is not surprising that he finds high 
levels of violence. This includes symbolic violence such as the ritual drinking 
of blood as well as actual feuding that often escalated into civil war. In an 
overview article, ter Haar (2000) relies considerably on Lewis for the earliest 
period, but he also shows that vengeance remained a common occurrence for 
centuries after unification. Although the Chinese elites took pride in their re-
fined civilian tradition (wen), in fact wen was slow to triumph over the martial 
tradition (wu). However, ter Haar does not rigorously distinguish between state 
violence, such as the beating up of officials in the imperial court, and interper-
sonal violence such as vengeance or blood sports. 
Robinson (2001) shows that even Ming China (1368-1644) was far from a 
peaceful society. He refers to publications in Chinese, Korean and Japanese 
dealing with the violence of beggars, robbers and members of fighter guilds 
who beat up persons for money, plus violence in brothels and gambling dens 
and through blackmail. His own research focuses on banditry. Even in the 
capital region bandits often had links with elite groups. Yet, Robinson esti-
mates that the incidence of daily violence in sixteenth-century Europe was 
higher, which might explain why a visitor like Matteo Ricci considered China a 
peaceful country. Even in the Qing period (1644-1911), however, the central 
state lacked control over some regions like the South-East coast, where bro-
therhoods and elite families were enmeshed in feuds. To this region we can add 
Macheng county, a mountainous area in mid-China at the border of three prov-
inces (Rowe 2007). From the expulsion of the Mongols until 1938 this region 
had an extraordinary reputation for violence that, according to Rowe, was well-
deserved for most of this period. Today it is a center of the Falun Gong move-
ment and its repression. It should be added that family avengers who were 
apprehended under the Ming and Qing usually suffered the punishment of ling 
chi, (badly) translated as death by a thousand cuts (Brook et al. 2008). 
Banditry equally has received attention in the historiography of India, in 
particular that practiced by the so-called thugs or thagi at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century (Wagner 2009: anthology of text plus introduction). Apprec-
iations by historians are diametrically opposed in this case. Some echo the 
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belief of contemporary British administrators that the thugs misled travelers, by 
acting friendly at first and then strangling them, in order to ritually offer them 
to the goddess Kali. Some Indian historians, on the other hand, simply dismiss 
this as a colonial fabrication. Wagner believes that through careful scrutiny of 
the evidence we can reconstruct a picture of actual bandits, who employed 
strangling next to other methods and often believed that a goddess protected 
them. The rituals they performed were no different from those of other Indian 
bandits, nor, we would add, from those of the eighteenth-century Dutch Bokke-
rijders. Also important for the history of murder outside Europe is Martin 
Wiener’s recent book (2009). He discusses interracial murder between 1870 
and 1935 in seven British colonies. Next to India these are Queensland, Fiji, 
Trinidad, the Bahamas, Kenya and British Honduras (now Belize). Wiener 
writes in a narrative fashion with even more emphasis on the judicial handling 
than on the cases themselves, but he does suggest that colonial and racial ten-
sions constitute an important explanatory factor. 
When considering violence in Russia, many would think first of a sequence 
of organized activities stretching from the anti-Jewish pogroms of the late-
nineteenth century via Stalinism to the modern mafia. The literature in Western 
languages touching on interpersonal violence before 1917 includes one study 
that deals in a narrative and literary fashion with notorious murders, mostly 
political, since about 1000 (Encausse 1992). Further, there are some scattered 
publications, of which Neuberger’s (1993) book on hooliganism, image and 
reality, in St. Petersburg on the eve of the First World War is perhaps the best 
known. Reyfman (1999) shows that dueling was uncommon in Russia until 
about 1800 and widespread especially among the military but also among fig-
ures prominent in literature, journalism, education and law until the end of the 
century. However, it was equally common and socially accepted for officers, 
intellectuals and aristocrats to settle conflicts over honor with non-stylized 
violence, even with an inequality of arms. An article by Kollmann (1998) on 
spousal murder deals with just a few selected cases from the seventeenth cen-
tury. These cases suggest that women were punished more harshly for this 
crime than men. Wife murder was often punishment-related. 
For Brazil there are various publications in Portuguese that should be ana-
lyzed for our project. The English-language literature on violence going back a 
few centuries is limited. Aufderheide (1976) deals with local court cases in the 
province of Bahia and stresses the importance of honor, vengeance and race as 
factors involved in violence. Rose (1998) is a very impressionistic work that 
discusses violence as a tool of maintaining elite dominance. Langfur (2006) 
discusses violence, by settlers of European and African descent as well as 
indigenous people, as a central element of the frontier experience in Minas 
Gerais in the late-eighteenth century. An unpublished dissertation (Souza 1999) 
deals with the changing character of violence in the province of Goiás, 1930-
80. 
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To this discussion of the work done for Brazil, we should add a few studies 
dealing with Spanish-speaking America. There has been progress in the history 
of dueling (Parker 2001; Gayol 2008), in the history of violence related to state 
formation (Centeno 2002) and of violence and crime in frontier areas with little 
state control (Rafart 2008; Boholavsky and Soprano 2010) and the emergence, 
in the twentieth century, of modern crime and its representation in newspapers 
and magazines (Caimari 2009; Piccato 2010). Additionally, there are studies on 
short-term trends in homicide and assault, but these are often localized. 
The work done so far for South-Africa is patchy. A good starting point for 
longitudinal research into murder is Worden and Groenewald (2005): a selec-
tion of court dossiers concerning crimes committed by slaves in the eighteenth 
century. Turrell (2000) is also a selection of archival documents, in this case 
pardon records, with commentary; here it concerns several types of murderers 
in the first half of the twentieth century. 
Transformations in State Violence: An Intermediary Factor? 
The crucial role of the evolution of the state for a theory about murder necessi-
tates a brief look into the violence employed by its representatives. Many scho-
lars believe that state-sponsored murder has increased since the turn of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as compared to the preceding history of 
mankind. However, despite the fact that states have grown more powerful over 
time with a monopoly on the means of killing and with new and more lethal 
means of killing, there is also evidence that state representatives have become 
more reticent in exercising their monopoly. 
The evidence for legal executions (excluding extra-legal ones, as under the 
Nazi regime for example) is unequivocal. In Europe, the number of legal ex-
ecutions of criminals began to rise in the sixteenth century, when compared to 
the preceding medieval period. This initial rise was related to the emergence of 
stronger and more stable states and a system of justice from above that replaced 
dispute settlement through arbitrary means and seeking revenge by way of the 
vendetta. As state formation processes continued, however, harsh justice grad-
ually came to be considered unnecessary and citizens increasingly demanded 
that the state exercise its monopoly of force with moderation. From the end of 
the seventeenth century and especially during the eighteenth, execution rates 
started to decline, even in absolute numbers. This development has been docu-
mented for such countries as England, the Netherlands and Germany (Spieren-
burg 1984; van Dülmen 1985; Sharpe 1990). In addition, the death penalty 
came to be restricted to lethal offenses, as opposed to being applied also in 
cases such as burglary and robbery. In the second half of the twentieth century 
nearly all European states abolished the death penalty. 
A parallel development of decline, but not of nationwide abolition, took 
place in the United States (Banner 2002; Spierenburg 2011). Most Latin Amer-
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ican nations even abolished the death penalty rather early, around 1930 or 
before, as part of their understanding of the “civilizing process.” During the 
formative period of centralized states (as in Argentina and Chile around 1880), 
on the other hand, they unleashed violence against mobile indigenous tribes 
and after their “victory” they were able to expand the area of cultivated land. 
Similarly, the Porfirio Diaz administration in Mexico expelled the Yaquis from 
their land. This can be considered as another example of ethnic cleansing. 
Turning back to Europe, there are other indications as well that states have 
increasingly been forced, over the last two hundred years and especially since 
the mid-twentieth century, to exercise their monopoly of force with modera-
tion. In the Netherlands, for example, a marked restraint in police violence is 
visible since the 1960s (Spierenburg 2008b). Other evidence comes from the 
history of social control generally, by state and non-state agencies. The major 
conclusion from two collective volumes, dealing with early modern and mod-
ern Europe respectively (Roodenburg and Spierenburg 2004; Emsley, Johnson 
and Spierenburg 2004) is that social control never was just a top-down pheno-
menon. The negotiation of norms was an important element in it, from seven-
teenth-century communities to twentieth-century dictatorships. Even so-called 
totalitarian regimes had to compromise, directing the main brunt of repression 
at targeted groups rather than at the population at large. Another intriguing 
conclusion referred to private violence, which could be an accepted tool of 
social control within local communities well into the seventeenth century. 
Since then, private violence shifted from being both means and object of social 
control to being only its object. 
Thus several, though not all, forms of state violence in Europe became more 
moderate along with the transformation and decline of homicide. The evolution 
of murder remains the core element in this overall transition. We now have a 
relatively good picture of long-term trends in the character of murder in West-
ern and Central Europe and to a lesser extent in North America. Even then 
there are conspicuous gaps, such as the lack of reliable quantitative evidence 
for France (before the start of national statistics in the 1820s). We also know 
relatively little about Eastern Europe, roughly to the East of the former Iron 
Curtain. For the non-Western world the evidence, if existing at all, is scant. 
State of the Art: Genocide and Mass Murder 
The scholarly literature on genocide has been expanding ever since Raphael 
Lemkin (1944) coined the concept. Notably with respect to the Holocaust, the 
number of studies is so vast that it is pointless to single out any title in particu-
lar. Suffice it to mention that one of us has contributed to this literature (John-
son 1999; Johnson and Reuband 2005). For the rest, we are not examining 
studies on individual genocides here. We wish to restrict ourselves to books, 
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many of them collective volumes, that purport to deal with genocide in a gen-
eral fashion. 
In some cases the subject ranges even more widely to include themes such 
as ethnic cleansing. One of the most wide-ranging is a German text-book en-
titled Ausgrenzung, Vertreibung, Völkermord (exclusion, expulsion, genocide) 
whose motto is the exceptionally violent character of the twentieth century 
(Benz 2006). Somewhat surprisingly perhaps, it opens with the so-called Octo-
ber pogroms in Russia in 1905. Many scholars, on the other hand, now consider 
the mass death and destruction of the Herero population in German Southwest 
Africa starting in 1904 to be the first genocide of the twentieth century (Hull 
2003 and 2005; Krueger 2005; Zimmer 2005). Benz further discusses, among 
other things, the killing of Jews, Sinti and Roma under the Nazi régime but also 
the expulsion of ethnic Germans from Poland and the Baltic region at the end 
of the Second World War. Here the net is cast very widely indeed. Although 
expulsion, and any kind of forced migration, implies violence or at least the 
threat of it, we cannot equate it with killing. 
That applies equally to studies that adopt ethnic cleansing as their primary 
theme, such as Naimark (2001) and Lieberman (2006). According to Naimark, 
“the intention of ethnic cleansing is to remove a people and often all traces of 
them from a concrete territory,” whereas genocide involves intentional killing. 
(3). Nevertheless, “ethnic cleansing has terrifying potential for genocide.” (15). 
Naimark explicitly refuses to pin the label of ethnic cleansing on any case of 
expulsion before 1900. In a similar vein, Lieberman considers it as a relatively 
modern phenomenon and perhaps with a better argument. According to him, 
ethnic cleansing is an outgrowth of modern nationalism that did not emerge 
until the nineteenth century. Eventually, it led to the collapse of the Habsburg 
and Ottoman empires, among others, and it put an end to many cosmopolitan 
cities in Central, Eastern and South-East Europe, in which various ethnic and 
religious groups had lived together for centuries. Again according to Lieber-
man, this process did not really get under way until the Bulgarization of Sofia 
in the 1870s. There may be a point in this, as early modern rulers and elites 
often had a cosmopolitan mentality. However, Lieberman himself also suggests 
a different perspective by calling ethnic cleansing the third of three waves of 
cleansing per se in Western history. The first involved religious cleansing, with 
the expulsion of Muslims from Spain and Huguenots from France. With the 
second he refers to the elimination of Native Americans. Thus, although (eth-
nic) cleansing does not necessarily always involve killing, the phenomenon 
alerts us to the need to examine the pre-1900 period. 
Whereas ethnic cleansing has been examined especially in relation to Euro-
pean history, most studies of genocide pay equal attention to non-Western 
countries, whether colonies of a European power or not. The standard series of 
genocidal episodes begins either with the Herero, already mentioned, or with 
the fate of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire during the First World War. 
 247 
The standard account then moves to Europe, with Hitler and Stalin as the main 
culprits. During the second half of the twentieth century and the first decade of 
the twenty-first, Asia and Africa constitute the main theater. While some au-
thors begin this period with Mao’s China, others consider the Cambodian “Kill-
ing Fields” in the years 1975-9 as a major episode (for example, Samantha 
Power 2002; Edward Kissi 2003). Rwanda in the 1990s and Darfur in the 
2000s also are standard cases. No author, however, deals with exactly the same 
series of episodes, which is partly due to their different definitions of genocide 
(see below). Thus, whereas the main shortcoming of the historical literature 
about homicide is its neglect of the non-Western world, the main shortcoming 
of the literature about genocide is its neglect of pre-1900 history. It is strongly 
suggested but not proven that genocide is a typically modern phenomenon. 
This applies, among others, to Power (2002), Weitz (2003), Midlarsky (2005) 
and Totten and Parsons (2009). 
Kiernan (2007) is the only author devoting more than minimal attention to 
earlier periods of history, but even for him 1900 constitutes a definite dividing 
line. Kiernan is mainly concerned with identifying a few factors that, according 
to him, operate in every genocide, instead of identifying long-term trends (see 
the critical review by Charles Tilly in Journal of Interdisciplinary History 39, 
2: 247). 
The Boundaries of the Project 
In our project we first used the term genocide. The question is whether we 
should stick to this term or replace it with something else: either mass murder, 
that we used in an even earlier phase of the project, or perhaps a new term, 
organized murder. 
The advantage of “genocide” lies in its unambiguousness. We do not have to 
define it, because it is already clearly defined as a legal concept. However, for 
historical and social scientific scholarship, the legal character of the term may 
also be a disadvantage. It may preclude the consideration of some cases of 
mass murder that we nevertheless want to include in our analysis. Indeed, some 
authors writing about genocide wrestle with this problem. Thus, Midlarsky, 
already referred to, refuses to deal with the Cambodian killing fields because 
the victims included a few Vietnamese but in great majority were Cambodians 
themselves. For the killing fields he reserves the term “politicide.” In a similar 
vein, Marchak (2003) considers genocide and politicide as subcategories of the 
more encompassing category of crimes against humanity. In his new book 
about Stalin’s crimes, Naimark (2010) sticks to the term genocide. In order to 
place Stalin’s activities under this label, Naimark goes at great length to argue 
that genocide ought to include the killing of social groups. A final problem 
with the definition of genocide lies in the fact that, as with ethnic cleansing, it 
does not necessarily refer to killing. Genocide includes the destruction of a 
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culture, rather than the people bearing this culture. To conclude, this particular 
concept is not really useful as a guide for our project. In this paper we opt for 
organized murder as the counterpart to homicide. 
Homicide has to be clearly defined as well. Homicide, whether condoned or 
considered criminal, involves interpersonal violence. In societies with stable 
state organizations, homicide can be clearly distinguished from state violence. 
Although any single homicide may be related to any kind of socio-political 
conflict, no scholar will confuse a separate lethal incident with genocide or 
ethnic cleansing. Homicide is essentially a form of individual or interpersonal 
violence. It usually but not always involves a single perpetrator confronting a 
single victim (with often only the outcome determining the role of the one and 
the other). There is no clear numeric threshold here, but two forms of multiple 
killing are regarded by most scholars as falling within the category of homicide 
rather than collective violence: feuding and serial killing. In both cases we are 
dealing with a set of separate incidents rather than one wave of mass murder. In 
feuding and revenge, although there are regularly multiple perpetrators, there is 
usually but one victim. In serial killing there is always but one perpetrator, 
although copycats may manifest themselves. Murder in the course of a robbery, 
finally, also usually involves no more than a few victims and perpetrators. 
It is much more problematic to distinguish organized murder from state vi-
olence. If we take mass mortality as our point of departure, the first that comes 
to mind historically is death in epidemics or disasters like earthquakes or 
floods. These are obviously not attributable to any human agent, although 
epidemics are most devastating when populations lacking antibodies come into 
contact with people carrying micro-organisms that are new to them. Perhaps it 
is more adequate to denote these forms of mass dying as non-reproachable. 
Reproachable forms of mass mortality are often, but not always, the result of or 
related to warfare. 
Analytically, we may distinguish four types of mass dying that is reproacha-
ble (or non-natural, or attributable to human action): 
1) In military conflicts as a result of battle. This would include both the killing 
of combatants and non-combatants or “collateral damage,” as in the bomb-
ings of cities in World War II. 
2) Indirectly, through political decisions or other organized measures that have 
the effect that many people die, usually by starvation. The prototype here is 
the famine in Ukraine, 1932-3, which is often termed a genocide. 
3) The conscious killing of civilians in times of war but relatively independent 
from military operations. In this case the prototype is the Holocaust, but it 
probably also applies to the case of the Armenians. 
4) Conscious killing without a state of war. The difference with (3) is one of 
degree only, since mass killing implies almost per definition the existence of 
some kind of socio-political conflict. There may have been a preceding civil 
war, a revolution, simultaneous militia fighting, establishing colonial domi-
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nation, etc. Therefore, it would be stretching the matter to replace “without a 
state of war” with “in times of peace.” 
In case of (1): death as a direct consequence of military operations is usually 
not called a murder, except polemically. For a scholarly study we should not 
include it in the category of organized murder. There is also a more practical 
argument: its inclusion would necessitate a consideration of all wars and mili-
tary conflicts in world history and hence make the project unmanageable. Esti-
mates of the death toll, for wars during the last four centuries in Europe for 
example, do exist (Gleichmann and Kühne 2004; Gleichmann 2006). When we 
consider category (2), the problem is that the attribution of guilt is always on 
shaky grounds, especially when we go back further in history. The labels of 
murder or even genocide are most frequently contested in this case. In his re-
cent book though Dikötter (2010) appears to lay the blame for China’s great 
famine on Mao. Yet, we would propose to leave famines out of consideration. 
Consequently, we propose to classify only types (3) and (4) of reproachable 
mass dying as organized murder. This implies a social-scientific rather than a 
legal classification, which we believe is necessary for a long-term investigation 
of murder and mass murder. 
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